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A recent report from the Center for Economic Policy Research
(CEPR) has advocated that ￿xed conversion rates for the start of EMU
should be preannounced as soon as possible. The aim of this short pa-
per is to focus on the potential dangers of such a decision. Indeed, the
CEPR report propositions are based on the idea that, roughly speak-
ing, ￿xing a conversion rate in advance should stabilize the exchange
rate markets now. We show that this intuition is misleading: knowing
the price of an asset at some point in the future has never meant that
its current price has a low volatility. Moreover, we perform some sim-
ulations to evaluate how volatile exchange rate markets should have
been for the past few months if such a rule had been announced. Fi-
nally, we provide a constructive proof of what a stabilizing rule should
look like.
1 Introduction
Various rules have been proposed to set the conversion rates of the curren-
cies of the future European Monetary Union (EMU). Indeed nothing in the
Maastricht Treaty prevents governments from announcing some rules well
in advance of the scheduled time (i.e., 1 January 1999). For example, M.
Lamfalussy, the former President of the European Monetary Institute has
proposed to set these rates as the average market rates over a given period.
We don￿t want to discuss here the advantages and the drawbacks of all these
rules since many things have already been said elsewhere (see De Grauwe
(1996), Frachot (1997a, 1997b), CEPR (1997) ). We prefer to focus on the
rule which is the most likely.
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1This rule is also the simplest one: it consists in preannouncing the con-
version rates in advance of 1 January 1999. For example, the conversion
rate between the french franc and the deutsche mark would be set at some
prede￿ned level1. Why such a rule ? The CEPR authors are legitimatly
convinced that the run-up to EMU should be seriously endangered if a cur-
rency crisis ever happened during the next few months. As a matter of fact,
such a currency crisis is not impossible regarding the amount of misunder-
standings between governments on what the EMU should look like. As a
result, a well-designed rule is crucially needed to remove as much volatility
as possible from the currency markets. In the CEPR authors minds, the
preannouncement of ￿xed conversion rates is the best way to stabilize these
markets from now until the end. Moreover, they claim that this rule should
be announced as soon as possible, that is before memberships decision (i.e.,
May 1998).
Their basic intuition2 is the following : when the price of an asset is
known at some point in the future (i.e., the FRF/DEM at 1 January 1999
is kown now) then its current price must have a low volatility. In other
words, the certainty brought by this future ￿xed point would stabilize the
whole path until this point. In fact, this intuition is simply incorrect. There
are many examples which contradict this intuition. Let us consider the ￿xed
income markets and take a classic bond. Imagine a 20 year 10 % bond whose
facial value is 1000 FRF: all the cash ￿ows generated by this particular asset
are perfectly known at the origination of the asset and remain so until its
very end. In particular, this asset entitled its holder to receive 100 FRF
every year and 1100 FRF at the last year and all these cash-￿ows are known
20 years in advance. In short, the price of this asset is perfectly known for
some point in the future. Moreover, in the case of government bonds, there is
generally absolutely no credibility concerns about whether the bond will be
reimbursed on time or whether the scheduled time will be postponed. Does
it mean that bond markets experience low volatilities ? Are these volatilities
considerably lower than in the share markets ? Even a two-year bond (which
is the analogous of our EMU problem) has a signi￿cant volatility.
As a matter of fact, there are two sources of volatility in the exchange
rate movements. The ￿rst one is not speci￿c to the EMU process. We shall
call it intrinsic volatility. This volatility comes directly from the market and
simply re￿ects the shifts of (market) expectation regarding futures interest
1As discussed in the cited papers, rules can be de￿ned on the bilateral conversion rates
but not on the conversion rate against the euro.
2This is essentially an intuition since the CEPR authors do not provide any rigourous
proof of what they claim.
2rates. Inversely, the second source of volatility is linked to the EMU process
itself. Indeed, there is some uncertainty about who will belong to the ￿rst
wave of the EMU and when it will eventually take place. The resulting
volatility of the exchange rate depends on how the conversion rule which
will be announced, manages these two sources of volatility.
From our former counter-example (i.e., the bond market example), the
CEPR authors rule is unlikely to be the one which minimizes the intrinsic
volatility. More generally, the aim of this paper is to show that this rule
is not the suitable rule to manage e¢ciently the two sources of volatility
especially if it is announced before memberships decision. Moreover we give
a rigourous proof of which rule should be announced to ￿nancial markets
in order to minimize the volatility of the exchange rates from now until the
end, even though the EMU is postponed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we build
a market expectation for the time to EMU and then we can compute what
the exchange rates would have been for the past few months if the discussed
rule had been preannounced a few months ago. The use of the expected time
to EMU allows to take account explicitly the second source of volatility. In
section 3, we derive what the ￿most stabilizing￿ rule should look like.
2 Exchange rate volatility and the Preannounce-
ment of conversion rates
Fundamentally, preannouncing the conversion rates for the start of the EMU
is equivalent to the ￿xing of the forward exchange rate for this particular
maturity. As we mentionned above, it dose not mean that the current ex-
change rate has a low volatility. Moreover, we can￿t prevent ￿nancial markets
from considering this maturity as uncertain. Though the scheduled time is 1
January 1999, ￿nancial markets may think di⁄erently and consider a post-
ponement as a non zero probability event. Clearly, by a classic covered
interest rate parity relation, it is obvious that any uncertainty on the ma-
turity of the forward rate will be transfered to the current exchange rate
and/or the current yield curves.
This is the point we want to illustrate. So we ￿rst build an expected time
to EMU. Then we plug it in a covered-interest-rate-like relation to derive
what the exchange rate should have been for the past few months if such a
preannouncement had been released.
32.1 An expected time to EMU
Our computations are very simple. They are based on the ECU market and
on the fact that two di⁄erent versions of the ECU (i.e., the basket and the
private ECU) co-exist (see Frachot (1997c) for a detailed analysis). The basic
intuition is the following. We suppose that ￿nancial markets are uncertain
about the precise date when the monetary union will eventually take place.
We assume however that they are perfectly convinced that the private and
o¢cial ECU will be set at par the day EMU starts. Then any deviation
between the two ECU reveals some information about the time to EMU.
There are strong reasons why we can assume that ￿nancial markets be-
lieve that this parity rule won￿t be violated. Indeed the Maastricht Treaty
states that the external value of the ECU (for example against Dollar) shall
not change at the moment the single currency, the Euro, is introduced. Fur-
thermore, at the Madrid summit, it was decided that the ECU would be
converted into Euro at a rate of one for one at the start of EMU. Combin-
ing these two statements with the fact that all ECUs are refered as basket
ECUs, will constrain the o¢cial and private ECU to be traded at par at the
start of EMU.
What are the consequences of this one-for-one rule for the current ex-
change rates and yield curves ? Let us denote T the (uncertain) time when
EMU takes place and S$=i the Dollar price of one unit of currency i: The
one-for-one rule imposes that:
S$=privateECU(T)=S $=basketECU(T)=S $=EURO(T):






where i belongs to the set of currencies of the basket and !i is the amount
of currency i in the basket.
We can now ￿discount￿ this equation at time t (t<T ) by considering
a trader who can invest either in the private ECU or in the currencies of
the basket. Let us denote ri(t;T) (respectively rECU(t;T)) the zero-coupon
yield for currency i (resp. private ECU) and for maturity date T: Investing
S$=i (t)=[1+ ri(t;T)]T¡t Dollars at time t ensures that 1 unit of currency i
is obtained at time T: Consequently, if markets remove e¢ciently any free
4lunch then the following relation should hold:
S$=privateECU(t)






Solving this equation in T gives an expected time to EMU3. The empirical
implementation of this expected time is detailed in Frachot (1997c). Figure
1 illustrates the value of this expected time for the past few months. We see
that this time to EMU is generally close to 1 January 1999 but sometimes
diverges signi￿cantly. For example, the discussions between France and Ger-
many during the Amsterdam summit have generated strong divergence of
this time indicator. As this indicator simply reveals the way ￿nancial mar-
kets hedge their private ECUs with the currencies of the basket (under the
one-for-one constraint), this divergence means that they have weighed more
heavily the probability of a postponement. As a consequence, our expected
time to EMU re￿ects the fact that ￿nancial markets have rebalanced their
portfolios accordingly.
2.2 What would exchange rates have been ?
The expected time to EMU can now be plugged in a usual covered interest
rate parity in order to evaluate its impact on current exchange rate and
yield curves. In this way, we fundamentally focus on the second source of
uncertainty, that is the uncertainty about the time to EMU.
Let us consider i and j two currencies and let us denote S⁄
i=j the prean-
nounced conversion rate between i and j. Let us also assume that prean-
nouncement took place on the begining of March 1997 (simply because our
data are available only from this date). Covered interest rate parity implies



















where pi(t) is the weight of currency i in the basket:
pi(t)=
! iS $=i(t)


























































































































































































































































































Expected time to EMU
Figure 1: Expected time to EMU
6Let us recall that a covered interest rate parity requires very few assump-
tions. It only necessitates that any arbitrage opportunities are e¢ciently
removed by the markets. In particular, we make no assumptions regarding
the risk neutrality or the utility preferences of the traders. However, we
use this no arbitrage constraint in a non conventional way since T is an
expectation and not a ￿xed, non random date.
The use of equation (1) is now rather trivial provided we say which of the
exchange rate or the yield curves will adjust to the variations of T. Clearly,
it is an open question. Some authors (Brookes (1996)) have argued that the
exchange rate is more likely to adjust than the yield curves because yield
curves are partially control by Central Banks. We shall adopt this point of
view although we believe that the adjustement will be more likely divided
between the two. Consequently, the ￿current￿ exchange rate obtained under





with the estimated T given previously4. Figure 2 shows the resulting ex-
change rate path for the Deutsche Mark and the Italian Lira. In order to
compare, we have also plotted the true exchange rate path observed during
this period. The least we can say is that this conversion rule has no stabiliz-
ing properties. In comparaison, we give in ￿gure 3 the same exchange rate
path for the FRF/DEM parity.
Obviously this graph is just an illustration as the volatility is more likely
to be split between interest rate and exchange rate movements. Moreover,
facing to such movements, Central Banks would certainly intervene. How-
ever it is not clear whether they should raise or lower their o¢cial rates as
the exchange rate movements illustrated in ￿gure 2 do not follow a clear
trend: the exchange rate depreciates or appreciates alternatively depending
on whether ￿nancial markets are convinced or not about the 1 January 1999.
In this respect, exchange rates movements seem higly uncontrolable.
Furthermore, in the particular case of Italy, we do not take into account
that T is probably not the appropriate time since there is another source
of uncertainty due to membership. Indeed, Italy has a lower probability
of belonging to the ￿rst wave of the EMU than France or Germany. As a
result, the time T to be used should certainly be much more volatile. The
corresponding exchange rate computed with our methodology would be even
more volatile.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Simulated exchange rate (FRF/DEM) under preannouncement
9As a consequence, if the ￿xed conversion rate rule was adopted, it should
be announced at the same time as memberships decision (i.e. in May 1998)
and not before, precisely because the most stabilizing rule is not this one. If
it was announced before May 1998, the Italian Lira would su⁄er from exces-
sive volatility and, in some sense, would pay for the uncertainty (imposed by
other countries) concerning its membership. Announcing the rule after May
1998 would certainly be safer. However, as we already mentionned about
the ￿bond market￿ comparison, the volatility of the exchange rate has no
reason to be zero.
Finally, the question is whether one can build a stabilizing rule. The
answer is yes: it su¢ces to use the ￿xed conversion rate rule with a small
correction related to the interest rate spreads between countries. In the case
of the core EMU (i.e. France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium...), this cor-
rection is rather innocuous but, for Italy, this rule would be much more
favorable as it would remove a large part of volatility.
3 An Optimal Rule
3.1 Some Intuition
The ￿xed conversion rule doesn￿t eliminate the intrinsic volatility of the
exchange rate. Moreover, when the scheduled time (i.e., 1 January 1999)
is not fully credible, then the rule increases this volatility and makes the
exchange rate unstable. As a matter of fact, the underlying idea of the
CEPR report is that one should ￿nd a stabilizing rule, that is a rule which
minimizes exchange rate movements from now until the end, even if the
￿end￿ doesn￿t correspond to 1 January 1999.
Actually, this goal can be achieved through a simple rule which ensures
that the instantaneous volatility of exchange rates is zero along the whole
path to EMU without adding any constraint on monetary policies and even
though EMU would have to be delayed. It means that exchange rates may
move from one day to another since Central Banks remain free, under the
rule, to in￿uence the interest rate spread through their monetary policies.
But the rule ensures that, whatever monetary policies are, the exchange rate
has no intrinsic volatility (i.e., the volatility provided by the market). As a
result, Central Banks have a full control of the exchange rate through their
central interest rates. Contrary to the previous rules, the market becomes
unable to add volatility to the exchange rate and then the only source of
variation of the exchange rate is directly due to variation of the Central
Bank interest rates.
10This rule is precisely not the rule advocated by the CEPR authors. As a
matter of fact, the rule which achieves the best ￿certainty￿ (i.e., no volatility
along the path) is not the rule which would set in advance some conversion
rates (i.e., the ￿pre-announcement of ￿xed conversion rates￿ rule promoted
by the CEPR authors). In order to have the most important certainty along
the path, we shall show that one must keep some randomness on the con-
version rates until the very end of the process.
The intuition of the rule is as follows. If we want almost no uncertainty
in the exchange rates process, we mean that, in some sense, we want the
EMU to be partially achieved before the scheduled time (1 January 1999).
What does ￿the EMU is achieved￿ mean ? It simply means that the French
Franc and the Deutsche Mark (say) are considered by ￿nancial markets
as perfect substitutes. So the rule must guarantee that any investment in
French Francs must have the same return as an investment in Deutsche
Marks (converted in French Francs on 1 January 1999). The solution is to
announce that the French Franc/Deutsche Mark parity will be equal to a
￿xed rate (for example, 1 DEM = 3.35 FRF/DEM) modi￿ed for the spreads
between the day-to-day interest rates of the two currencies. If this spread
is equal to zero along the path to 1 January 1999 then the conversion rate
will be exactly the ￿xed rate (here 3.35 FRF/DEM). Otherwise, the rule
garantees to the markets that, if a currency has bene￿tted from a higher
interest rate before 1 January 1999 then this higher return will be o⁄set by
a corresponding depreciation of the currency at that time. In this way, the
two following investments will appear as fully equivalent:
† invest 1 FRF at the (french) day-to-day interest rate;
† convert 1 FRF in DEM, invest these DEM in the (german) day-to-day
rate, convert them back in FRF on 31 December 19985.
This implies that the two currencies will be treated as (almost) perfect
substitutes by ￿nancial markets6.
Moreover, the French Franc and the Deutsche Mark remain substituable
until the start of EMU whenever it actually takes place. Indeed, the previous
5Of course, the same equivalence holds for the symmetric investment of 1 DEM.
6We can carry on the ￿bond market￿ comparison. As mentioned in the introduction,
a traditional bond has some intrinsic volatility although its future cash-￿ows are ￿xed
and perfectly known. Our optimal rule can be understood through the ￿oating rate note
market where bonds generate interest rate related cash ￿ows. Standard ￿nance theory
shows that a pure ￿oating rate note is traded at par. So its price does not vary over time
and has no volatility. Fundamentally, our optimal rule relies on exactly the same intuition.
11intuition is totally independent of the actual starting time. EMU could
be delayed and would not endanger exchange rate markets provided that
they are convinced that conversion rates will be ￿nally ￿xed through this
mechanism. As a conclusion, the two sources of volatility are removed.
3.2 The Formal Rule
Appendix 1 and 2 propose two constructive proofs of the ￿most stabilizing￿
rule whose intuition is given above. The ￿rst one (i.e., appendix 1) is the
standard proof. Alternatively, a second proof (i.e., appendix 2) is derived
using the way of reasoning of ￿nancial engineers. As a matter of fact, it
gives the shortest and most elegant proof.
Starting from the previous intuition, it is straightforward to write the for-
mula which has to be announced. Ler rFRF(s)and rDEM(s) the day-to-day
money rates for the French Franc and the Deutsche Mark. Let SFRF=DEM
be a target for the conversion rate (e.g. SFRF=DEM =3 : 35): the ￿xed con-
version rates rule of the previous section would consist in announcing that
the conversion rate will actually be SFRF=DEM. Here, we slightly modify
the pre-announcement: at time t0, it is announced that the ￿nal conversion
rate will be equal to SFRF=DEM with an additional term to take into ac-
count that the two money rates might be di⁄erent until the ￿nal term. So







Before we investigate its properties, let us make a few remarks. First
this formula captures the intuition provided in the previous subsection: if
the French Franc has a better return than the Deutsche Mark (i.e., rFRF >
rDEM) then this higher return will be exactly o⁄set by a corresponding
depreciation of the Frenc Franc against the Deutsche Mark. As a result, in-
vesting in the two currencies is equivalent. So any movement in the exchange
rate is not due to shifts in market expectations but comes from change in
monetary policies.
Secondly, whether T is equal to 1 January 1999 or not has no importance:
the only thing needed to ensure the currency substituability is that the EMU
will take place ￿some day￿ (i.e., T<1 ). Consequently, the two sources of
volatility (i.e., the intrinsic one and the one related to the uncertainty of the
time to EMU) are eliminated.
12Aside these important features, the optimal rule has other interesting
advantages which are described in the following subsection.
3.3 Some properties of the optimal rule
This optimal rule has many advantages compared with the other rules
investigating in the previous sections. First, this rule doesn￿t lead to strong
discontinuities the day it is publicly released. Applying the master formula
(4), we obtain that, at time t0, the equilibrium exchange rate is exactly
SFRF=DEM. As a result, the jump is equal to:
¢=S FRF=DEM ¡SFRF=DEM(t0¡1)
which is independent of the current yield curves. So the jump doesn￿t depend
on which degree of convergence the yield curves have achieved. It only
depends on the current exchange rate and the target SFRF=DEM. Moreover
the jump is likely to be quite small either because the target has been chosen
such as ¢ is zero (i.e., SFRF=DEM is taken not too far from the current
exchange rate) or because the central parity of the ERM has been choosen.
Indeed, as we mentionned earlier, the ￿xed conversion rate rule advocated by
the Governor of the BoF (with central parities) is impossible at the moment
since it could imply strong discontinuities due to insu¢cient convergence of
the yield curves. With the optimal rule, central parities can be announced
at any time without any signi￿cant jump of the current exchange rates.
On the other hand, the e⁄ective exchange rate at the ￿nal term will be
slightly di⁄erent from the target since it will compound the remaining spread
between day-to-day interest rates. However, as it will become clear in the
sequel, Central Banks will have a strong incitation, under this rule, to make
their o¢cial rates converge to one another because (among other reasons)
the no-volatility property of the exchange rate doesn￿t necessitate to keep
any risk premium. In any case, taking the central parities (i.e., small jump)
or the current exchange rate (i.e., zero jump) would be rather equivalent
at the moment since all currencies of the future EMU trade around their
central rate.
Secondly, there is a strong incitation for Central Banks to make their
o¢cial rates converge to one another. We have just mentionned the fact
that risk premia should vanished away due to the absence of exchange rate
volatility. This is typically the case for France where the BoF states that
it has to maintain a spread with Germany to keep the exchange rate under
13control7. It is worth noting that the exchange rates become under the full
control of Central Banks since they completely depend on the day-to-day
interest rates which are under the in￿uence of the o¢cial rates. It may
seem dangerous to give the Central Banks such a power but this situation is
certainly better and safer than a control by ￿nancial markets. However, the
optimal rule implies a di⁄erent behavior of the Central Banks. A quick look
of the master formula (4) shows that an increase of the french interest rate
l e a d st oadepreciation of the French Franc vis-￿-vis of the Deutsch Mark
instead of an appreciation8. This means that Central Banks are strongly
incitated to converge. The proof is straightforward. Indeed, whatever the
criteria focused by Central Banks are when they implement their monetary
policies, we know that their reaction functions are more or less some weighted
functions of in￿ation, activity and exchange rate volatility. Let us drop the
exchange rate part since, under the optimal rule, exchange rate volatility
has disappeared. There remain (domestic) in￿ation and activity. If a given
Central Bank weighs more the activity variable, it should be incitated to
lower signi￿cantly its interest rates (other foreign interest rates being equal).
The consequence is a global appreciation of its currency. For this country,
the gain of activity drawn from such a monetary policy will be diminished by
the appreciation of its currency. Conversely, if the Central Bank puts more
weigh on in￿ation, any tentative to rise its interest rates turns out to be
less productive since the exchange rate depreciates and imported in￿ation
increases. As a result, the optimal policy of Central Banks is to equalize
their interest rates as quickly as possible. As soon as equalization is reached,
exchange rates become perfect substitutes as no drift nor volatility remain
any longer.
Thirdly, the whole yield curves will be pushed to converge to one an-
other. As soon as currencies are perfect substitutes, the yield curves must
mechanically equalized as well. Any remaining spread would mean that
some arbitrage are pro￿table. However, as for any rule, a credibility spread
might remain if there is a risk for the EMU to be postponed or for the rule
to be abandoned. Obviously, this risk is not speci￿c to the optimal rule but
is shared by all other rules.
7This spread is currently of 15 basis points.
8Interestingly, the optimal rule imposes that the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity Hy-
pothesis strictlt holds (see Frachot (1996).
144 Concluding Remarks
The most likely rule for ￿xing conversion rates on 1 January 1999 is certainly
the one advocated by the CEPR authors, that is the preannouncement of
￿xed conversion rates. However, there are no theoretical reasons which would
prove that this rule is the most stabilizing one. Conversely, our theoretical
discussions as well as our simulations show that this rule is higly sensitive
to any postponement of the EMU process and to the memberships decision.
Moreover, if this rule was announced before memberships decision, then the
ITL/DEM exchange rate would certainly be higly volatile.
Moreover, we derive what the best rule should look like. This rule is
closed to the previous one except that it takes into account the interest
rate spreads between the currencies. Interestingly, this rule minimizes the
volatility of the exchange rate from now until the end and is not sensitive
to a postponement of the EMU nor to memberships decision.
Appendix 1
Here is the standard proof of the stabilizing feature of the optimal rule.
Let us recall that, under this rule, the conversion rate is ￿xed by the following
formula:
Si=j(T ¡ 1) = Si=j .
T¡1 Y
s=t0
1+r i( s ) = 360
1+r j( s ) = 360
Proposition 1 Under the optimal rule, the variance of the time-t exchange
rate Si=j(t) conditionally to t ¡ 1 is exactly equal to zero:





Proof: The proof is rather straightforward and needs no assumptions
except the no-arbitrage hypothesis and, as usual, perfect credibility of the
rule. However, whether EMU starts on time or not has no importance.
As a ￿rst step, let us show how the time-T ¡ 1 exchange rate is deter-
mined. The two usual strategies give the following earnings:
† invest 1 unit of currency i at T ¡ 1 to obtain a time-T a￿ o wo f
1+r i( T¡1)=360;
† convert 1 unit of currency i in currency j (that is, 1=Si=j(T ¡1) units
of j), invest this amount of currency j and convert it back at time T.
The time-T ￿ow is:
Si=j(T)
Si=j(T ¡1)
: (1 + rj(T ¡ 1)=360):
15These two strategies cost 1 unit of currency i at time T ¡1 and provide
two known ￿ows since, by formula (2), Si=j(T) is known at time T ¡ 1.S o
these two ￿ows must be equal; otherwise, one could ￿nance one investment
by the other in order to obtain a strategy which would cost nothing and
would give a positive gain with certainty. This would be a violation of the
No-Arbitrage hypothesis. As a result, Si=j(T ¡ 1) is necessarily given by:
1+r i( T¡1)=360 =
Si=j(T)
Si=j(T ¡ 1)
: (1 + rj(T ¡ 1)=360):
Replacing Si=j(T) by its value yields:
Si=j(T ¡ 1) = Si=j .
T¡2 Y
s=t0
1+r i( s ) = 360
1+r j( s ) = 360
(3)
which is exactly the same formula as in the de￿nition rule (2) taken one step
before. It is straightforward to understand that the same argument applies
for the whole path between t0 and T; so, we have proved the following
lemma:
Lemma 2 (Master Formula) Under the optimal rule, the time-t exchange
rate is necessarily given by: (Master Formula)
8 t0 <t•T; Si=j(t)=S i=j .
t¡1 Y
s=t0
1+r i( s ) = 360
1+r j( s ) = 360
(4)
Since the time-t exchange rate is perfectly known at time t, its variance
conditional to t ¡ 1 is zero:
8 t0 <t•T; Vt¡1 (Si=j(t)) = 0:
This ends the proof. ¥
It is straightforward to show that our optimal rule is the only rule which
removes all intrinsic volatility from the exchange rate process without im-
posing any constraint to monetary policies.
We have thus proved that, under the optimal rule, once traders know
the current interest rates, they perfectly agree on what the next period
exchange rate must be, whatever their expectations, their preferences or
their risk aversions are. Any movement of the exchange rate results from a
variation of the interest rate spread.
More importantly, the whole proof is independent of the time when the
EMU starts. We only need that T<1 ;that is that the EMU will eventually
take place ￿some day￿.
16Appendix 2
We give a simple, ￿nance-oriented proof of the stabilizing propety of
our optimal rule. Under the no-arbitrage assumption, Harrison and Kreps
(1979) and Harrison and Pliska (1981) have shown that there exists a risk-
neutral probability measure under which discounted prices were martingale.
In the particular case of the exchange rate market (see for example Amin
and Jarrow (1992)), this fundamental proposition can be translated into the
following equation:








where ri(s) (resp. rj(s)) is the instantaneous spot rate for country i (resp.
j) and where the expectation is taken under the risk-neutral probability.





(ri(s) ¡ rj(s))ds: (6)
Indeed, if we plug equation (6) into equation (5), we obtain:
8t>t 0;S i=j(t)=S i=j(t0)exp
Z t
t0
(ri(s) ¡ rj(s))ds (7)




=( r i( t )¡r j( t ))dt:
Furthermore, equation (5) remains valid even if T is random. We do
not want to enter a technical discussion on what random means in this
context. In particular, T may be random for political reasons independently
of market conditions. We know that, in this case, markets are incomplete
and then equation (5) is satis￿ed for more than one risk neutral probability
measures. Remarkably, our result still holds no matter there are several risk
neutral probability measures: equations (5) and (6) imply formula (7) for
all risk neutral probability measures.
As a result, our rule keeps its stabilizing e⁄ect even if the time to EMU
is uncertain and is robust to any kind of postponement.
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